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I. Introduction
The issue of faith and reason arises from the claim that there are two
kinds of truths: some truths are discoverable or comprehensible to human
understanding and some are not. This claim is found at least in the three
Abrahamic religions. The Christian theologian John Owen expresses the
view that there are truths of faith and truths of reason in the following
words:
And there are many things revealed unto faith that are above and beyond the comprehen-
sion of reason in the best and utmost of its proper exercise: such are the principal mysteries of
Christian religion. And it is the height of folly to reject them, as some do, because they are not
discernible and comprehensible by reason, seeing they are not contradictory thereunto.1
Among “the most proper subjects of divine revelation” are the triu-
nity and incarnation of God as well as the resurrection of the dead. These
are “above our reason […] because finite and limited”.2 Yet, these truths
come “with an evidence and certainty of a higher nature and nobler kind
than that of the strictest demonstration in things natural or the most forci-
ble argument in things moral.”3
Now, this claim of two kinds of truths raises a number of questions.
Granted that there are two kinds of truths, the question raises itself as to
whether or not these kinds are related. More specifically, given that there
are truths about God that are above and beyond the comprehension of
reason, there is the question how (if at all) they are inferentially related to
claims about God that are (arguably) within the comprehension of reason.
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1 John OWEN, The Reason of Faith, ed. William H. GOOLD, 24 vols., vol. 4, The Works of
John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850–1855, 1677), 86. The full title may by note-
worthy: The Reason of Faith; Or, An Answer unto that Inquiry, “Wherefore We Believe the
Scripture to Be the Word of God;” with the Causes and Nature of that Faith wherewith We
Do So: wherein the Grounds whereon the Holy Scripture is Believed to Be the Word of God
with Faith Divine and Supernatural Are Declared and Vindicated.
2 Ibid., 54. “a light superadded to the innate conceptions of men’s minds, and beyond what of
themselves they can extend unto, because it is concerning such things as the heart of man could
never of itself conceive, but the very knowledge of them is communicated by their revelation, 1
Cor. ii. 9, 11.” John OWEN, Pneumatologia: A Discourse Concerning the Holy Spirit, ed.
William H. GOOLD, 24 vols., vol. 3, The Works of John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hun-
ter, 1850–1855, 1674), 232.
3 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 105.
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For instance, do the truths about God that are comprehensible to reason
provide the evidence that epistemically justify those truths that are not
comprehensible to reason? In other words, how, if at all, are revelatory
and non-revelatory truth claims related? Moreover, if reason cannot com-
prehend some claims, how can it be sure or certain that they are true be-
cause “they are not contradictory”? Not every non-contradictory claim is
true, and claims are usually certain on account of evidence to the senses
and/or reason, but how can a claim be certain without such evidence?
Furthermore, what is the relation (if any) between theology and all other
disciplines? If there are truths of faith, there may be a discipline devoted to
those, but would it relate to other disciplines?
In this paper I will address two issues.4 First I will investigate Owen’s
view of the role (if any) of rational or philosophical arguments concerning
God in making faith intellectually good, and I will argue that according to
Owen such argumentation has no role in an individual’s act of faith. In
other words, philosophical reasoning is, according to Owen, neither neces-
sary nor sufficient in coming to faith in God. That which concerns the act
of faith is rationally incomprehensible and faith thus relies on divine reve-
lation alone. Second, and following on from the first issue, I will examine
how Owen can regard faith as an intellectual kind of act when it is the
nature of faith to lack evidence comprehensible to reason. Thus I will deal
with faith in its relation to other kinds of intellectual acts and with the
distinctive characteristic of faith, namely the will to assent to the truths of
faith. There is a closely aligned and third issue, namely the role of philoso-
4 Owen’s epistemology has been generally neglected. The only exception I know of is Paul
Helm’s remark that on faith and reason Owen stands in continuity with the medieval period:
Paul HELM, “Introduction,” in Faith and Reason, ed. Paul HELM (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1999), 135. Helm also includes an extract from Owen (pp. 166–168). This paper
aims to improve on my earlier discussion: Sebastian REHNMAN, Divine Discourse: The Theo-
logical Methodology of John Owen (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2002), 109–154. In this
paper I do not consider the sources and context of Owen’s doctrine. Apart from Owen’s ap-
pendix to The Reason of Faith that briefly attempts to show the catholicity of Owen’s conclu-
sions from patristic, medieval and reformation sources, there are no explicit references to other
accounts of the relation between faith and reason. However, his contemporary Gisbertus VOE-
T IUS contends (in the disputation De ratione humana in rebus fidei) that Aquinas distinguishes
rightly between faith and reason (Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum,
5 vols. (Utrecht: Johannes Waesberg, 1648–1669), I.3.) Voetius refers to AQUINAS Summa
theologiae 1.1.8. It would be of interest to establish how closely Owen agrees with Aquinas on
faith and reason, but space does not permit me to do so here. I simply refer the reader to
Thomas AQUINAS, Super Boëthium De Trinitate, vol. 50, Opera omnia (Rome/Paris: Com-
missio Leonina/Éditions Du Cerf, 1992, 1257–8) I– II, Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica,
22 ed., 6 vols. (Taurini/Romae: Marietti, 1940, 1266–73), 1.1, Brian J. SHANLEY, The Tho-
mist Tradition, ed. Eugene Thomas LONG, vol. 2, Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy of
Religion (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), 21–43, and M. F. SPARROW, “The Proofs of Natural
Theology and the Unbeliever,” American Catholic philosophical quarterly 65 (1991), 129–
141. The reader may also want to look up Thomas BARLOW, Exercitationes aliquot metaphy-
sicae de Deo, 2 ed. (Oxford: Lichfield, 1658), 167–172.
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phy in theology. This issue concerns the relation between theology and all
other disciplines. However, there is not space here to argue that, according
to Owen, although the faithful need not be philosophers, theologians must
be philosophers, because philosophy is the presupposition of theology. I
leave that for another occasion. Here I limit myself to analyse Owen’s ac-
count of the traditional view that truths of faith are certainly true to the
faithful, although they lack the evidence of the senses and of reason. So,
this paper attempts to clarify an orthodox protestant view of faith and rea-
son, and suggests its historical continuity and contemporary relevance.
II. Does Faith Require Reason for Epistemic Justification?
I will start with Owen’s view of philosophical argumentation for
claims about the existence and revelation of God, since this will pave the
way for a deeper analysis both of the nature of faith and reason, and of
the relation between philosophy and theology.
Let me start with two interpretations of Owen’s view of philosophical
arguments that cannot both be true.
On the one hand, there is William Cunningham’s interpretation of
Owen as a straightforward fideist; that is, someone who denies any rela-
tion between faith and reason or claims that nothing we know counts for
or against the truth of, say, the triunity and incarnation of God or the
resurrection of the dead.5 Owen, according to Cunningham, “exhibited to
an erroneous extent” the “tendency” to “disregard or despise the rational
or external evidences for the truth of Christianity” in favour of “the work
of the Spirit”.6 However, according to Owen, it would be “irrational” to
claim that the Holy Spirit is the ground or reason of faith,7 and that faith
5 Alvin Plantinga defines ‘fideism’ as an “exclusive or basic reliance upon faith alone, accompa-
nied by a consequent disparagement of reason and utilized especially in the pursuit of philoso-
phical or religious truth” Alvin PLANTINGA, “Reason and Belief in God,” in Faith and Ra-
tionality: Reason and Belief in God, ed. Alvin PLANTINGA and Nicholas WOLTERSTORFF
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), 87. For an overview of fideism together
with a bibliography see, Richard AMESBURY, “Fideism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philo-
sophy (Summer 2005 Edition), Edward N. ZALTA (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/ar-
chives/sum2005/entries/fideism/.
6 William CUNNINGHAM, Theological Lectures on Subjects Connected with Natural Theology,
Evidences of Christianity, the Canon and Inspiration of Scripture, ed. Thomas SMITH (Lon-
don: James Nisbet & Co., 1878), 226. Cunningham also refers to Owen on pp. 324 and 330.
Cunningham probably failed to grasp the distinction Owen infers between the function of ra-
tional evidence in an individual act of faith and the function of rational evidence in the disci-
pline of theology; taking the denial of the former as a denial of the latter. It may be conjectured
that Cunningham made this mistake for contextual reasons. In his context he aims to defend
that faith is reasonable, and seems to understand natural theology as a response to the ques-
tioning of the reasonableness of Christian faith. Owen’s context and understanding is different.
7 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 55–6.
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would be “irrational” if philosophical arguments “were absolutely dis-
carded”.8 Indeed, it would be “senseless”, according to Owen, to talk to
unbelievers of the creed as the ground or reason of faith.9 He calls it
a mistake […] to suppose [1] that we resolve all faith unto private suggestions of the Spirit
or deluding pretences thereof; and [… 2] that we confound the efficient cause and the formal
reason of faith or believing, rendering all rational arguments and external testimonies useless.10
So Owen himself already challenged the view that Cunningham is as-
cribing to him. Owen says positively that humans are given reason “to use
it in those things which are of the greatest importance unto them”, namely
God and ourselves.11 For right reason teaches that “there is an eternal, in-
finitely wise and powerful Being, by whom” the world was “caused, pro-
duced, and made”.12 So, according to Owen himself, he is not at all con-
tending what Cunningham claims.
On the other hand, there is Alan Clifford’s interpretation of Owen as
a “rationalist.”13 Clifford does not define this ambiguous term, but in this
8 Ibid., 21.
9 Ibid., 16.
10 Ibid., 15. Further on in the same work Owen writes that what he pleads for “is liable to be
mistaken” as a “retreat” to the Spirit of God and “a pretence to discard all rational arguments,
and to introduce enthusiasm into their room.” However, such a “charge is grievous, yet, […]
groundless” (59). For “neither do we nor can we answer by it [the work of the Spirit] unto this
question, why do we believe.” (60) Moreover, “the illuminaton of the Holy Ghost, […] consist-
ing solely in enabling the mind unto that kind of assent which is faith divine and supernatural,
on supposition of an external formal reason of it duly proposed, is not the reason why any do
believe, nor the ground whereinto their faith is resolved.” (61) “no internal work of the Spirit
can be the formal reason of our faith, […] yet without it we can never sincerely believe as we
ought” (68).
11 Ibid., 60. Cf. “a neglect of the improvement of” the intellectual powers to the end of knowing
and living to God “is the highest aggravation of sin.” (83) The term ‘reason’ is here used
broadly for “the due exercise or reason, or the natural faculties of our minds” (54). Cf. John
OWEN, A Vindication of the Animadversions on “Fiat Lux”, ed. William H. GOOLD, 24
vols., vol. 14, The Works of John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850–1855, 1663),
357.
12 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 89, cf. 9, 86–89, John OWEN, The Grace and Duty of Being Spiri-
tually Minded Declared and Practically Improved, ed. William H. GOOLD, 24 vols., vol. 7,
The Works of John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850–1855, 1681), 353, 355, 370,
409, 411. Contrary to Cunningham, Owen contends that human beings are undoubtedly ob-
liged “to consider all things of” the nature of “reasons and motives as are proposed unto them,
and not to receive it with brutish, implicit faith; for the receiving of it is to be an act of men’s
minds or understandings, on the best grounds and evidences which the nature of the thing
proposed is capable of.” OWEN (see above, n. 1), 81.
13 “It is paradoxical that Tillotson, rather than Owen, has been viewed as a the rationalist.” For
Owen “was significatly influenced by the older a priori, scholastic rationalism.” Alan CLIF -
FORD, Atonement and Justification: English Evangelical Theology 1640–1790 An Evaluation
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 43. Clifford’s use of ‘a priori’ and ‘scholastic’ is, of course,
as historically inaccurate as his phrase “Owen’s Aristotelian methodology.” (8) The terms ‘me-
taphysics’, ‘scholastic methodology’ and ‘Aristotelian method’ would seem to be used synony-
mously by Clifford (96; cf. 129).
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context ‘rationalism’ means the view that faith must be grounded on that
which can be conceptually and experientially available to all people, at all
times and at all places.14 So on this kind of rationalism faith must be infer-
entially based on the foundations of reason and sense in order to be episte-
mologically justified. The view that some intellectual acts depend on other
intellectual acts and that some intellectual acts do not depend on any other
intellectual act is called foundationalism, and the view that every act of
faith must depend on evidence available to reason is called evidentialism.15
So Clifford is more precisely charging Owen with evidentialist foundation-
alism. However, Owen is explicitly opposed to the view “that all things
may be reduced unto sense and reason.”16 He claims that to faith, divine
revelation “evidenceth its own truth, not with the same kind, but with an
evidence and certainty of a higher nature and nobler kind than that of the
strictest demonstration in things natural or the most forcible argument in
things moral.”17 He moreover maintains that the “spiritual experience,
which believers obtain through the Holy Ghost, is such as cannot ration-
ally be contended about, seeing those who receive it cannot fully express
14 Clifford is clearly not considering Owen a rationalist as opposed to an empiricist (namely, the
view that (some) knowledge is ultimately independent of sense experience as opposed to the
view that knowledge is ultimately dependent of sense experience), but a rationalist as opposed
to a fideist (namely, that faith must be grounded in reason as opposed to grounded in itself). For
an overview of rationalism generally together with a bibliography see, Peter MARKIE , “Ration-
alism vs. Empiricism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward
N. ZALTA (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/rationalism-empiri-
cism/, and Thomas M. LENNON and Shannon DEA, “Continental Rationalism”, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2007 Edition), Edward N. ZALTA (ed.), URL = http://pla-
to.stanford.edu/archives/win2007/entries/continental-rationalism/. Merold Westphal defines the
relevant sense of ‘rationalism’, namely as “an appeal made by rationalists and empiricists alike
[in the context of the so-called Enlightenment] to limit religion to those grounds, whether a
priori [conceptual] or experiential, which are available to all people, at all times, and in all
places. The contrast is […] between reason and faith, in so far as the latter is tied to special
revelation and a particular ‘church.’” Merold WESTPHAL, “Modern Philosophy of Religion,”
in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, ed. Philip L. QUINN and Charles TAL IAFERRO
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1997), 112. Paul Helm elaborates on this sense of rationalism: “Rational-
ism requires the elimination of mystery and paradox from theology as a condition of believing;
or at least as a condition of continuing to believe. The propositions of faith have to meet some a
priori criteria of intelligibility, either rational or empirical, before they are worthy of belief.”
Paul HELM, Faith and Understanding (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1997), 107.
15 Strictly, this is evidentialism within religion. Here ‘evidence’ means rational, intellectual or pro-
positional evidence to faith. But it is possible to maintain a broader evidentialism according to
which every good intellectual act must be based on some evidence of whatever kind. Cf. An-
thony BOOTH, “The Two Faces of Evidentialism,” Erkenntnis 67 (2007), 401–417, and John
ZEIS , “Evidentialism and Faith: Believing in Order to Know,” Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association 80 (2007), 185–200.
16 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 59. “in this case […] the truth is not exposed to sense, nor capable of
scientifical demonstration” (47).
17 Ibid., 105. Moral certainty or probability would seem to go back to the methodological princi-
ples of the Nicomachean Ethics.
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it, and those who have not cannot understand it, nor the efficacy which it
hath to secure and establish the mind”.18 So, Owen denies the reduction of
faith to reason and claims that faith is ultimately incomprehensible and un-
speakable.
Now, it is fairly easy to show that both Cunningham and Clifford has
misunderstood Owen’s view of philosophical arguments concerning the ex-
istence and revelation of God. But it is more difficult to make sense of
what Owen really means. Can it be coherent to claim, as Owen does, both
that philosophical arguments count in favour of faith and that philosophi-
cal arguments are not the ground of faith? Or, if he is not a fideist nor an
evidentialist, what is he? We thus need to analyse what Owen really
meant.
Let us first probe into philosophical arguments. Owen discusses expli-
citly and elaborately the use of philosophical arguments both for the exis-
tence and revelation of God.19 Mostly he calls such an argument “an ex-
ternal argument”,20 because it provides a proposition with “outward
evidence of its truth”.21 These arguments “arise from all the indubitable
notions that we have of God or ourselves, in reference unto our present
duty or future happiness.”22 For instance, if humans “use and exercise the
best of their rational abilities in the consideration and contemplation of”
the world, they have evidence of the being and power of God.23 Similarly,
“There are sundry cogent arguments, which are taken from external con-
siderations of the Scripture, that evince it on rational grounds to be from
God.”24 Here Owen argues from the antiquity, preservation, aim and suc-
cess of Scripture, as well as the testimony of the church to Scripture.25
Likewise there are external arguments for the Trinity and Christ.26
18 Ibid., 64.
19 Most of the material on philosophical arguments in The Reason of Faith relate to the revela-
tion of God. But there and elsewhere he expresses the same view regarding philosophical argu-
ments for the existence of God. For instance, OWEN (see above, n. 12), 352–357, 370.
20 Other terms are “rational considerations”, OWEN (see above, n. 1), 5., “rational motives of
faith” (45), “rational arguments or motives” (82). “There are sundry cogent arguments, […]
motives of credibility, or effectual persuasives to account and esteem it [Scripture] to be the
word of God.” (20, cf. 55, 61, 68).
21 Ibid., 37. It would seem to be external or outward evidence in the sense of outward or external
to revelation. Thus this usage would seem to suppose truths that can be known both naturally
and supernaturally. In one instance Owen uses the phrase “external arguments” for “the first
dictates of reason”. Propositions that are true on the evidence of the meaning of their terms
“are not capable of being confirmed by external arguments” (87).
22 Ibid., 68.
23 Ibid., 9, OWEN (see above, n. 12), 352, 353, 355, 370, 409, 411.
24 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 20.
25 Ibid., 20–47.
26 John OWEN, A Brief Declaration and Vindication of the Doctrine of the Trinity: As Also of
the Person and Satisfaction of Christ, ed. William H. GOOLD, 24 vols., vol. 2, The Works of
John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850–55, 1669). I have pursued this issue in Se-
bastian REHNMAN, “Does it matter if Christian doctrine is contradictory? Barth on logic and
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The “use” and “proper place” of philosophical arguments is twofold.27
“In the first way,” they are “considered as previous inducements unto believ-
ing”,28 but this “use is not great, nor ever hath been in the church of
God”.29 “Hence they were not of old insisted on for the ingenerating of
faith”.30 So the first use of philosophical arguments is to dispose to rather
than to produce faith. “But in the second way”,31 philosophical arguments
are used as “concomitant means of strengthening faith in them that do be-
lieve.”32 In this way, rational arguments “may be pleaded with good use and
purpose” “wherever there is occasion from objections, oppositions, or temp-
tations”.33 In addition Owen maintains that philosophical arguments should
be used against attacks from atheism,34 but it is not clear whether this is a
third use or merely a defensive application of the two other uses.
Owen is clear on the probative force of philosophical arguments. He
writes: “for we will allow the utmost assurance that can be claimed upon
them.”35 “external arguments […] are effectual motives to persuade us to
give an unfeigned assent”.36 Where the “use and exercise of their best ra-
tional abilities […] is neglected, […] men degenerate into atheism.”37 Yet,
philosophical arguments are “not demonstrations”, but “produce an opi-
nion only, though in the highest kind of probability, and firm against ob-
jections”.38 The ultimate reason why people still reject such arguments is,
according to Owen, lust and weakness of will. For “it is an unreasonable
thing not to assent unto them”39 and “nothing but perverse prejudice can
detain men from giving a firm assent unto” them.40
theology,” in Encounters with Barth: Contemporary Evangelical Critiques, ed. David GIBSON
and Daniel STRANGE (New York/London: T & T Clark, 2008).
27 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 71. Compare “proper place” here with “their property is to level the
ground, and to remove the rubbish of objections out of the way, that we may build the safer
on the sure foundation” ( 21), and “place” and “proper end” (50).
28 Ibid., 71. Here the “place” and “proper end” of rational arguments are “to beget such an
assent unto the truth as they are capable of effecting”; namely, “the mind is prepared and
disposed by them unto the receiving the truth in its proper evidence.” (50)
29 Ibid., 71.
30 Ibid., 72.
31 Ibid., 72.
32 Ibid., 71. Rational arguments are “necessary unto the confirmation of our faith herein against
temptations, oppositions, and objections.” (20, 21, 47, 49) “of singular use for the strengthen-
ing of the faith of them that do believe” (47). “corroborated” (21) “for the defence against
gainsayers and their objections” (49). Assent is “fortified and confirmed, against exceptions
and objections” by “rational considerations” (5).
33 Ibid., 72.
34 Ibid., 71.
35 Ibid., 50.
36 Ibid., 15.
37 Ibid., 9.
38 Ibid., 50.
39 Ibid., 45.
40 Ibid., 46.
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But the most rational arguments for the being of the Deity will never prove an effectual
cure unto a predominant love of and habitual course in sin, in them who have resisted and
rejected the means and motives unto that end declared in divine revelation; and unless the love
of sin be cured in the heart, thoughts in the acknowledgement of God will not be fixed in the
mind.41
So, although philosophical arguments may not be convincing subjec-
tively, they are convincing objectively.42
From this material we should therefore conclude that Owen is not a
(straightforward) fideist, since he maintains that philosophical or rational
arguments for the existence and revelation of God are significant or count
in favour of the truths of faith.
We need then, second, to consider Owen’s view of the ground or rea-
son of faith. He denies emphatically and persistently that philosophical ar-
guments are the ground of faith: “they neither are, nor is it possible they
ever should be, the ground and reason whereon we believe”.43 Owen has
two major reasons for this, since two things needs to be considered regard-
ing true faith. “The first respects the subject, or the mind of man, how it is
enabled thereunto; the other, the object to be believed, with the true reason
why we do so believe”.44
First, faith is grounded in divine revelation or supernatural evidence.
We have already noted that the things of “faith are”, according to Owen,
“above and beyond the comprehension of reason”.45 The object of faith is,
more precisely, “invisible things, things capable of no demonstration from
sense or reason, as respects divine revelation only, whereinto alone it is
resolved”.46 Here Owen defines revelation strictly as that which only re-
spects or contains things that cannot be demonstrated from sense and rea-
son. So faith is “an assent of another kind”,47 since its evidence is “divine
revelation”.48 And the “nature” of the evidence of revelation is “an evi-
dence unto faith, and not to sense”.
It is not like that which the sun gives of itself by its light, which there needs no exercise of
reason to assure us of, for sense is irresistibly affected with it; but it is like the evidence which
41 OWEN (see above, n. 12), 355.
42 There are two things that hinder or disenable divine and supernatural faith. Rational argu-
ments are directed only to one of them. “This […] obstruction or hindrance [of prejudice] may
be so far removed by external arguments and motives of credibility, as that men may upon
them attain unto a moral persuasion […]; but these arguments cannot remove or take away the
native blindness of the mind, which is removed by their renovation and divine illumination
alone.” OWEN (see above, n. 1), 58.
43 Ibid., 20. This is repeated troughout (e.g. 5, 47, 49).
44 Ibid., 55. These are called “subjective” and “objective” on p. 59.
45 Ibid., 86.
46 Ibid., 37. Cf. “the interposition of any other authority between the things to be believed and
our souls and consciences, besides the authority of God, overthrows the nature of divine faith”
(19).
47 Ibid., 21.
48 Ibid., 17.
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the heavens and the earth give of their being made and created of God, and […] it is required
hereunto that men use and exercise the best of their rational abilities.49
Thus divine revelation “is sufficient of itself to secure their faith in
this matter”.50
Secondly, faith is not a mere exercise of reason, but a grace or free
gift of God, since philosophical arguments result, according to Owen, in
“a mere effect of reason. There is no more required unto it but that the
reasons proposed for the assent required be such as the mind judgeth to be
convincing and prevalent”. Faith would then be “a naked exercise of rea-
son”, because “the act which is exerted on such motives […] is purely nat-
ural”.51 Here Owen explicitly denies the implicit naturalism of evidential-
ism. According to evidentialism, faith can only be the natural outcome of
arguments and each believer ought to be able to present his or her proposi-
tional evidence. However, if
the whole work of believing would be a work of reason […, this] both overthrows the
nature of faith, substituting as assent upon natural evidence in the room thereof, and is abso-
lutely exclusive of the necessity or use of any work of the Holy Ghost in our believing, which
sober Christians will scarcely comply withal.52
Owen maintains on the contrary that faith is a God-given capacity.
He argues by analogy of the power of seeing.53 Any animal with a prop-
erly functioning faculty of sight is able to see the light of the sun, for the
“sense” of sight is “irresistibly affected with” the evidence that “the sun
gives of itself by its light”.54 Now, “It is in this case [of supernatural
things] as in things natural”; unless a human animal is endued with “a due
visive faculty” the supernatural light or evidence of revelation will not be
seen nor any argument in favour of it.55 For “we must believe the revela-
tion and the things revealed with the same kind of faith, or we bring con-
fusion on the whole work of believing.”56 Thus Owen defines faith as
supernatural, infallible and divine: “our faith is supernatural, with respect
unto the production of it in our minds by the Holy Ghost; and infallible,
with respect unto […] divine revelation; and is divine, in opposition unto
what is merely human, on both accounts.”57
It may, though, be wondered whether any use is left for philosophical
arguments concerning the existence and revelation of God on Owen’s ac-
count. But he writes: “They are left unto us as consequential unto our be-
49 Ibid., 9.
50 Ibid., 77.
51 Ibid., 49. Similarly 46.
52 Ibid., 54.
53 Ibid., 56, 9, 82, 89. Cicero may be the source of this analogy (cf. 89–90).
54 Ibid., 9.
55 Ibid., 56.
56 Ibid., 51.
57 Ibid., 18.
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lieving, to plead with others in behalf of what we profess, and for the jus-
tification of it unto the world.”58 This formulation is significant. Philoso-
phical arguments for the existence and revelation of God are “consequen-
tial” or follow after faith, and faith is not a consequence or does not
follow philosophical argumentation. External arguments are for the justifi-
cation of the Christian religion to the world. This is contrary to evidential-
ism. First, in that evidentialism assumes that something can only be taken
to be true on account of valid arguments, but Owen clearly contends that
most things are assented to without any argument because of the reliability
of the senses.59 Second, this is contrary to evidentialism in that Owen does
not conceive of natural theology as a response to atheism. It is not in-
vented in order to justify faith. Rather, natural theology is just part of phi-
losophy or science (broadly conceived).60
Thus Owen is not a (straightforward) evidentialist, because he main-
tains that philosophical or external arguments for the existence and revela-
tion of God are not the ground of the individual act of faith. Faith is the
graced response to revelation.
So this section has established that Owen is neither fideist or evidenti-
alist because, according to him, rational arguments count in favour of faith
and yet they are not the ground of faith.
III. Cognitive Kinds of Acts
Now, while philosophical arguments count in favour of the existence,
revelation, triunity and incarnation of God and the resurrection of the
dead, faith is not, according to Owen, grounded on such arguments but by
grace on revelation. Although not based on sense or reason, faith is “ac-
companied with more assurance than any assent which is the effect of
58 Ibid., 48.
59 No exercise or argument of reason is needed to assure an animal of the light of the sun. Ibid.,
9, 56.
60 Several historical studies have in different ways established that it was only during the so-called
“Enlightenment” that natural theology began to be used in order to justify individual acts of
faith. For instance, Guy DE BROGLIE , “La vraie notion thomiste des praeambula fidei,” Gre-
gorianum 34 (1953), Nicholas WOLTERSTORFF , “The Migration of Theistic Arguments:
From Natural Theology to Evidentialist Apologetics,” in Rationality, Religious Belief, and
Moral Commitment, ed. Robert AUDI and William J. WAINWRIGHT (Ithaca/London: Cor-
nell University Press, 1986), Nicholas WOLTERSTORFF , John Locke and the Ethics of Belief
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 118–133, John CLAYTON, Religions, Rea-
sons and Gods: Essays in Cross-Cultural Philosophy of Religion, ed. Anne M. BLACKBURN
and Thomas D. CARROLL (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For a develop-
ment and defence of the traditional (as opposed to the Enlightenment) conception of natural
theology, see Sebastian REHNMAN, “Natural Theology and Epistemic Justification,” Hey-
throp Journal 48 (2010).
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science upon the most demonstrative principles.”61 Thus faith not only
holds things to be true but, according to Owen, it holds things to be true
in the most certain way. Yet, it may then be queried, how can there be
assurance or certainty apart from such evidence that grounds other kinds
of assent? Owen’s answer is in short, God; faith can be certain apart from
rational evidence on account of God. His full answer is occupied with dis-
tinctions and divisions, and to understand what kind of act Owen consid-
ers faith to be, we need to see it in the context of his psychology and epis-
temology.
First, there is the general framework. What Owen attempts to do is to
“show what it is, what power, what faculty in the minds of men, where-
unto this revelation is proposed, and whereby we assent unto the truth of
it”.62 He inquires into the nature of the intellect, and the “nature and es-
sence” of its acts,63 before he reflects on and attempts to validate the
claims of the intellect in terms of certainty and probability. The starting
point is “rational faculties” or “distinct faculties and powers of our
souls”,64 where the term “faculty” does not signify “organ” but “powers,
abilities, qualifications, and endowments”.65 This priority of faculties and
their objects remind us of the traditional view of epistemology as part of
philosophical anthropology, and its realist assumption that there is first
knowledge of things and only later knowledge of knowledge. This is the
opposite of one of Owen’s famous students, John Locke, who contends
that “the mind, in all of its thoughts and reasonings, hath no other im-
mediate object but its own ideas”.66
Second, there is a major distinction. In Owen’s theory of knowledge
the traditional distinction between sensation and intellection – “sense and
reason” – is fundamental.67 Sense knowledge is about what we perceive
61 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 100–101. From the context it appears that Owen uses “assurance”
and “certainty” as synonymous translations of the Latin certitudo. In this context “the firmi-
tude and constancy which we have in the assurance of faith” is also used. This certainty of
faith is similarly expressed elsewhere: “Yea, our faith is capable of giving an assent, though of
another kind, more firm, and accompanied with more assurance, than any given by reason in
the best of its conclusions” (90).
62 Ibid., 82.
63 Ibid., 100.
64 Ibid., 12, 83. Cf. “facultas proprie est qualitas, qua idoneum quid dicitur, vt afficiatur. Facultas
autem & potentia non sunt [illegible Greek probably meaning “equivalent”]. […] At potentia
[…] habet se ex parte materiae, quae magis proprie est mera potentia: sicut facultas ex parte
formae, quia ab ipsa & facultatibus omnis actus prodit.” Rudolphus GOCLENIUS , Lexicon
philosophicum (Frankfurt: Mathias Becker, 1613) 565.
65 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 38. These may be of two kinds: “moral or natural endowments”
(32–33).
66 John LOCKE, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. Peter H. NIDDITCH (Ox-
ford: Clarendon Press, 1979, 1689), IV.i.
67 Cf. OWEN (see above, n. 1), 59, 86, 90, GOCLENIUS (see above, n. 64), 383. This distinction
goes back at least to ancient Greek philosophy and held sway until Descartes.
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(see, hear, smell, taste, feel, etc.), and intellectual knowledge is about what
we understand. These manners of knowledge are related in that “our
senses [… are] the means of” the intellectual powers.68 Through the senses
we directly know the concrete particulars and through the intellect we in-
directly know general meanings or natures.
This difference between the knowledge of the senses and that of the
intellect may become clearer when we turn to Owen’s distinction between
various kinds of objects. Psychical powers only have meaning in reference
to their acts, works or operations, and the acts of the soul only have mean-
ing in reference to their objects: “the due respect of the faculty unto the
object”.69 For every consideration there is an object toward which the
mind is directed. Owen distinguishes objects into two kinds: material ob-
jects and formal objects. The “material object” is “the things which we do
believe”. The “formal object” is “the cause and reason why we do believe”
or “that which it rests upon and is resolved into”,70 “the evidence whereon
we give this assent”,71 or, simply, “the ground”.72 Imagine that Fido is
barking. Fido’s sound is not the object of your eyes, Fido’s colour is not
the object of your nose, and Fido’s being a terrier is not the object of your
ears, but Fido is still the object of your mind. The thing considered, namely
Fido, is what Owen calls the material object. The aspects under which Fido
is considered he calls the formal object, and so Fido’s noise is the formal
object of the act of hearing, Fido’s colour is the formal object of the act of
seeing, and Fido’s nature or dogness is the formal object of the act of un-
derstanding. It is moreover the formal object that makes acts into the kind
of acts they are:
it is the formal object or reason of all our acts from whence they are denominated, or by
which they are specified. And the formal reason […], is that which prevails with us to believe,
and on whose account we do so.73
It is the formal object that makes acts auditive, visual, tactile and so
forth. “That, therefore, which proposeth any thing unto us as true, with
evidence of that truth, is the formal object”74 For example, a given noise is
evidence of and suggests that Fido is barking. Yet, the material object and
the formal object cannot be distinguished in experience, but is an abstrac-
tion.75 In short, the senses and the intellect have the same material object,
but differ as to formal object.
68 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 85.
69 Ibid., 64.
70 Ibid., 16.
71 Ibid., 17.
72 Ibid., 18.
73 Ibid., 46. More on specification of acts: 17, 51, 53.
74 Ibid., 60.
75 Ibid., 51.
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Owen devotes further attention to the rational or intellectual powers,
because he makes the traditional assumption that the reliability of the
senses is unquestionable. The intellectual faculties are also called three
ways, or “kinds of assent”,76 namely (1) the “inbred principles of natural
light, and the first rational actings of our minds”; (2) the “rational consid-
eration of things externally proposed unto us”; and (3) faith.77 The word
“assent”means here, of course, to hold something to be true: “we assent unto
any thing that is proposed unto us as true, and receive it as such”.78 These
three all belong to reason or the intellect as opposed to the senses, since in
traditional logic, assent or affirmation belongs to the intellectual act called
judgment, which is one of three operations or acts of the intellect (appre-
hension, judgment and reasoning).79 It is Owen’s account of these kinds of
assent that we need to investigate in order to understand his claim that faith
can be certain apart from the evidence that grounds other kinds of assent.
The first faculty is “a power of apprehending”,80 and the first op-
eration of the intellect yields “first apprehension”81 (traditionally called
“simple apprehension”). It is “apprehension” as opposed to “either ex-
press reasoning or farther consideration”.82 By this power humans “as-
sent unto self-evident natural principles, as that the part is less than the
whole or the like.”83 Indeed, these “first dictates of reason […] are noth-
ing but its assent.”84 From the very meaning of the terms they are taken
76 Ibid., 17. It seems that they are called “kinds of assent” from the view-point of logic/epistemol-
ogy, and are called “faculties and powers” from the view-point of psychology.
77 Ibid., 82–3.
78 Ibid., 82. “Assensus est quies intellectus, qua adhaerescit conclusionibus, vt, acquiescentia est
quies voluntatis in aliquo, quod habetur vel habitum est. Ille est firmus vel languidus.” GO-
CLENIUS (see above, n. 64), 128.
79 E.g. Thomas AQUINAS, Expositio libri Posteriorum analyticorum, vol. 1*/2, Opera omnia
(Paris, 1989: Vrin, 1269–72), 1 l. 1 n. 4.: “Sunt autem rationis tres actus: quorum primi duo
sunt rationis, secundum quod est intellectus quidam. Una enim actio intellectus est intelligentia
indivisibilium sive incomplexorum, secundum quam concipit quid est res. Et haec operatio a
quibusdam dicitur informatio intellectus sive imaginatio per intellectum. Et ad hanc operatio-
nem rationis ordinatur doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro praedicamentorum. Secunda
vero operatio intellectus est compositio vel divisio intellectus, in qua est iam verum vel falsum.
Et huic rationis actui deservit doctrina, quam tradit Aristoteles in libro perihermeneias. Tertius
vero actus rationis est secundum id quod est proprium rationis, scilicet discurrere ab uno in
aliud, ut per id quod est notum deveniat in cognitionem ignoti. Et huic actui deserviunt reliqui
libri logicae.”
80 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 84. In this context Owen uses “natural light” synonymously (82),
and calls this power the “natural light and the common reason of mankind” (23). We may call
this the intuitive faculty or simply intuition. For the second intellectual power is a power of
reasoning that is by contrast called the “discursive faculty”, and Owen compares the first kind
of assent with “instinct in irrational creatures.” (82). But “intuition” is nowadays associated
with a very different epistemology.
81 Ibid., 82.
82 Ibid., 82.
83 Ibid., 88. The same example is used on p. 83 and twice on p. 105.
84 Ibid., 82.
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to be true, and thus “the mind is necessarily determined to assent unto
the proper objects of these principles; it cannot do otherwise.”85 The
“principles of natural light” are “inbred”86 as opposed to “things exter-
nally proposed”,87 so that “the mind embrace in itself the general no-
tions of moral good and evil, with the difference between them”.88Acting
contrary to “the light of nature” leads to “a maze of folly and wicked-
ness.”89
The second faculty or power is simply assent by “rational considera-
tion of things externally proposed unto us. Herein the mind exerciseth its
discursive faculty, gathering one thing out of another, and concluding one
thing from another”,90 either certainly or probably.91
The third (and to our query the most relevant) faculty is faith, “the
power of our minds to assent unto truth upon testimony”.92 For all things
assented to on faith have “some sort of inevidence or obscurity attending
them”,93 and acts of faith would be overthrown by the necessity or cer-
tainty of evidence.94
It belongs unto the nature of faith, of what sort soever it be, that it be built on and re-
solved into testimony. This is that which distinguisheth it from any other conception, knowledge,
or assent of our mind, on other reasons and causes.95
This intellectual act is called or denominated ‘faith’ not “from the ob-
ject of it” but “from the nature of the assent”. Thus the term ‘faith’ is used
“equivocally”.96
Assent is an act then of the intellect on account of evidence whereby
something is affirmed of something else. In traditional epistemology, acts
of assent are further denominated, specified or differentiated either on
account of the degree of assent or on account the nature of the evi-
85 Ibid., 82. Also here “the first principles of reason are evident in themselves without farther
proof or testimony”.
86 Ibid., 82, 85, 86, 87.
87 Ibid., 83.
88 Ibid., 82.
89 Ibid., 23.
90 Ibid., 83.
91 Ibid., 70.
92 Ibid., 105. “it is the nature of faith to be built on an external testimony.” (63) Similarly pp. 53,
83, 85, 90. “the understanding cannot assent unto any thing with any kind of [testimonial?]
assent, natural or supernatural, but what is outwardly proposed unto it as true, and that with
sufficient evidence that it is so.” (60) Faith is “the effect and product” of some testimony or
argument (47).
93 Ibid., 64.
94 Ibid., 19, 51, 54.
95 Ibid., 53.
96 John OWEN, The Doctrine of Justification by Faith through the imputation of the Righteous-
ness of Christ; Explained, Confirmed and Vindicated, ed. William H. GOOLD, 24 vols., vol.
5, The Works of John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850–1855, 1677), 72.
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dence.97 Assents that differ on account of degree are either certain or prob-
able. “Our assent can be of no other nature than the arguments and mo-
tives whereon it is built, or by which it is wrought in us, as in degree it
cannot exceed their evidence.”98 In things natural there can be demonstra-
tion, necessity or certainty; in things moral there can be various degrees of
probability. Assents differ also either on account of intrinsic evidence or
on account of extrinsic evidence: “the nature of every assent is given unto
it by the nature of the evidence which it proceedeth from or relieth on.”99
The nature of the evidence comes either from the thing itself (intrinsic evi-
dence) or from some witness or testimony (extrinsic evidence). For in-
stance, the “sense” of sight is “irresistibly affected with” the evidence
“which the sun gives of itself by its light”.100 Intrinsic evidence “is suffi-
cient of itself to secure” such assent.101 “If there be such a light and evi-
dence in the things themselves, with respect unto our reason, in the right
use and exercise of it, then is the mind thereby necessitated unto its as-
sent”.102 But external evidence is needed when there is not sufficient evi-
dence in the things themselves and the testimony of an authority is needed.
Lastly, these intellectual powers can, according to Owen, be strength-
ened or weakened, since there are dispositions (habitus) of the mind.103
For “the faculties of men’s minds are naturally enlightened and enlarged”
by arts, sciences and wisdom.104 Arts and sciences are traditionally called
intellectual virtues. Humans are, on the other hand, subject to “vicious ha-
bits of their minds,”105 namely intellectual vices.
With this psychological and epistemological background, we may
now better understand Owen’s view of acts of Christian faith. According
to him, Christian faith belongs to one of the “three ways whereby we as-
sent unto any thing that is proposed unto us as true, and receive it as
such”.106 Although faith “is not to be fully expressed by any one single
habit or act of the mind or will distinctly whatever”,107 it is above all a
kind of assent or affirmation that something is the case: “That God is one
in three persons, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and the like proposi-
97 For a brief statement, see R. P. PHILL IPS , Metaphysics, vol. 2, Modern Thomistic Philosophy:
An Explanation for Students (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1935).
98 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 50. Once Owen uses “evident certainty” (33), which seems to mean
the certainty which evidence yields.
99 Ibid., 17.
100 Ibid., 9.
101 Ibid., 77.
102 Ibid., 54.
103 OWEN (see above, n. 96), 100.
104 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 22–23. Also “invention, and conjectures” (23).
105 Ibid., 87.
106 Ibid., 82.
107 OWEN (see above, n. 96), 100.
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tions”.108 However, the triunity of God cannot be sensed or experienced
(at least not in this life), and the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ cannot
be argued demonstratively.109 In other words, there is not, according to
Owen, intrinsic evidence of the triunity and incarnation of God. This lack
of evidence makes faith in some external evidence necessary, since faith is
the kind of intellectual act that relies on external evidence.
Christian faith has then two distinctive features according to Owen: it
is assent on account of God’s testimony and is desire on account of the
goodness of God’s acts.
First, Christian faith distinguishes itself by its reliance on God’s testi-
mony. “The material object of our faith,” writes Owen, “are the articles of
our creed”,110 and “the formal reason” is “God’s truth and authority.”111
As the material object of Christian faith is of a supernatural kind and nat-
ure, so must, according to Owen, its formal object be of a supernatural
kind and nature: “we must believe the revelation and the things revealed
with the same kind of faith, or we bring confusion on the whole work of
believing.”112 Christian faith is then “an assent of another kind”,113 since
its evidence is “divine revelation”.114 This evidence also “removes the mor-
al certainty treated of out of our way.”115 Only that is infallible evidence,
which is “immediately from the first essential Verity.”116 And this faith is
the gift of God: “all which is properly called faith, with respect unto divine
revelation, and is accepted with God as such, is the work of the Spirit of
God in us, or is bestowed on us by him”.117 So, Christian faith considered
108 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 16. “It belongs to the nature of faith [...] that it be built on […]
reasons and causes.” (53).
109 Cf. “[T]he nature of faith in general […] is, such an assent unto and confidence of invisible
things, things capable of no demonstration from sense or reason, as respects divine revelation
only, whereinto alone it is resolved”, ibid., 37.
110 Ibid., 16.
111 Ibid., 49. Strictly the material object of faith is the articles of the creed and the formal object
of the act of faith is revelation. Therefore the material object do not have “the nature of a
testimony” (53) but the formal object has that nature.
112 Ibid., 51.
113 Ibid., 21.
114 Ibid., 17. “Justifying faith is not a higher, or the highest degree of this faith, but is of another
kind or nature.” OWEN (see above, n. 96), 72.
115 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 51.
116 Ibid., 51. “It is because God himself, the first truth, who cannot lie, hath revealed and de-
clared these things so to be, and he who is our all requireth us so to believe.” (70) “In his
bearing witness he [God the Father] is an object of belief. […] God, as the prima Veritas, upon
whose authority is founded, and whereinto all divine faith is ultimately resolved, […] is the
prime object thereof.” John OWEN, Of Communion with God the Father, Son, and Holy
Ghost, Each Person Distinctly in Love, Grace, and Consolation, ed. William H. GOOLD, 24
vols., vol. 2, The Works of John Owen (London: Johnstone & Hunter, 1850–1855, 1657),
11–12.
117 OWEN (see above, n. 1), 56–57.
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as assent refers to the veracity of God, and faith considered as duty refers
to the authority of God.118
Second, Christian faith distinguishes itself by desire of God. We no-
ticed earlier that it was the nature of faith to lack evidence. Owen argues
that this absence of evidence to the intellect is solved by the will:
the evidence which we have in things scientifical is speculative, and affects the mind only;
but the evidence which we have by faith effectually worketh on the will also, because of the
goodness and excellency of the things that are believed.119
The excellency of the material object of faith he means here is its
“goodness and suitableness unto the souls of men as to their present condi-
tion and eternal end.”120 This condition is “our present depravation and
apostasy from God”.121 For there are two closely associated ends of hu-
man nature. The “only two great concerns of our nature, of any rational
being” is living and enjoying God.122
These things are necessary to our nature, so that without them it were better not to be; for
it is better to have no being in the world, than, whilst we have it, always to wander, and never
to act towards its proper end, seeing all that is really good unto us consists in our tendency
thereunto and our attainment of it.123
In faith the intellect is determined by the will, because God appears as
the proper end of human nature and the will embraces God. Believing, or
being faithful to God, is by grace to intend one’s ultimate good, “wherein
the blessedness of our nature doth consist.”124 However, the “due appre-
hension of such a goodness suitable unto our constitution and condition”
is impossible without an “antecedent assent of the mind”.125 We will only
what we know, and we cannot will God unless we know some of God. So
in coming to faith there is first a knowledge of God that triggers the will
to desire God. The will does not then supply new or additional evidence to
the mind, but yields firmness or certainty. In faith the mind still lacks evi-
dence, but the will grasps the suitable goodness that results in certitude.
Perhaps this is why Owen sometimes uses the word “faith” synonymously
with “hope”126 and “confidence”.127 Hope and confidence are clearly psy-
chic acts that have prominent voluntary aspects.
118 Ibid., 54, 18, 70.
119 Ibid., 101. In this context Owen follows a medieval distinction between “the certainty of ad-
herence” and “the certainty of evidence” in explaining the difference between faith and
science.
120 Ibid., 53, cf. 54.
121 Ibid., 29.
122 Ibid., 26, 109, 110. Cf. Westminster Shorter Catechism, q. 1.
123 Ibid., 28.
124 Ibid., 29.
125 Ibid., 53.
126 Ibid., 16, “faith or hope”.
127 Ibid., 37. “faith, affiance, and confidence” OWEN (see above, n. 116), 13.
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So this section has established Owen’s account of the certainty of
faith. Faith can be certain apart from the evidence of first principles and
the evidence of further inferences, because it is a God-given ability to em-
brace the evidence of revelation.
IV. Conclusion
Owen’s epistemology does not fit well with contemporary labels nor
with stereotypical accounts of Protestant orthodoxy. He is neither a
straightforward evidentialist nor a straightforward fideist, since faith is a
grace or free gift of God and is based on revelation or supernatural evi-
dence. Yet he is a fideist in the sense that faith is not based on rational
evidence, and an evidentialist in the sense that Christian faith ought to
have some rational or cognitive support. Owen does not maintain that
faith must have evidence of a rational kind and denies that reason can pro-
vide necessary evidence that God is triune or was incarnated in Jesus
Christ. No one can come to faith merely by rational evidence, but rational
evidence contributes significantly to whether or not one has faith. Perhaps
Owen could be said to be a fideist in relation to individual acts of faith,
and an evidentialist in relation to revelation. Formally faith is assenting by
or on account of God’s testimony, and materially faith is desiring by or on
account of the goodness and suitableness of God’s acts. But faith is more
ordered towards truth than towards good, and is therefore more an intel-
lectual act than a voluntary act.128
SUMMARY
The issue of faith and reason arises from the claim that there are two kinds of truths: some
truths are discoverable to human understanding and some are not. This paper argues that the
epistemology of the prominent orthodox protestant theologian John Owen (1616–1683) does
not fit the labels of evidentialism and fideism. According to evidentialism, every cognitive act
(including faith) must depend on evidence available to reason. According to fideism, there is no
relation between faith and reason so that nothing of reason can be counted for or against faith.
But Owen is a fideist in the sense that faith is not based on rational evidence, and an evidentialist
in the sense that Christian faith ought to have some rational or cognitive support. Philosophical
arguments count in favour of faith and are not the ground of faith. The paper suggests that this
nuanced view is a viable alternative and option.
128 I thank the participants of the conference John Owen Today, held at Westminster College,
Cambridge University, 19–22 August 2008, for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Die Frage nach Glaube und Vernunft ergibt sich aus der Behauptung, dass es zwei Arten
von Wahrheiten gibt: diejenigen, die dem menschlichen Verstehen zugänglich sind, und diejeni-
gen, die es nicht sind. Dieses Papier argumentiert, dass die Erkenntnistheorie des prominenten
orthodoxen evangelischen Theologen John Owen (1616–1683) nicht zu den Etiketten des Evi-
dentialismus und Fideismus passt. Gemäß des Evidentialismus beruht jede kognitive Handlung
(einschließlich des Glaubens) auf Beweisen, die der Vernunft zugänglich sind. Nach dem Fideismus
gibt es keinerlei Beziehung zwischen Glaube und Vernunft, so dass es keine vernünftigen Gründe
für oder gegen den Glauben gibt. Aber Owen ist in dem Sinne ein Fideist, dass für ihn der
Glaube nicht auf rationalen Beweisen beruht, und ein Evidentialist in dem Sinne, dass seiner An-
sicht nach der christliche Glaube rational oder kognitiv gestützt sein sollte. Philosophische Argu-
mente gelten zu Gunsten des Glaubens, erweisen sich aber noch nicht als Fundierung des Glau-
bens. Das vorliegende Papier legt nahe, dass diese differenzierte Sicht eine sinnvolle Alternative
und Option darstellt.
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